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I. INTRODUCTION
Could a graph display the ways that tight coalitions form on a supreme court?
Wouldn't it be interesting to juxtapose the corresponding arrangement of the
justices in one subject matter, such as tort, to a different one, such as criminal
procedure? We propose such a method of illustrating tight splits that also reveals
all swing votes.
In this article, we develop a method for illustrating graphically (a) the
majorities that issue tightly split opinions; (b) the swing votes between the
different majorities; and (c) the opinions those majorities issue.' We develop this
method in the setting of the five-member Indiana Supreme Court as it was
constituted between 1999 and 2010 using its composition as defined by its junior
justice being Justice Robert D. Rucker.2 The other members of the court were
Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard and Justices Brent E. Dickson, Frank Sullivan,
Jr. (an author of this article), and Theodore R. Boehm. As the court's membership
did not change during that nearly eleven-year period, there were a substantial
number-176-tightly split decisions. We examine them and observe many swing
votes, varied coalitions, and differentiation by opinion subject matter. We
develop graphical techniques to illustrate those different tendencies.
The principal contribution of this article is in laying the groundwork for
visualizing and analyzing voluminous tightly split opinions, the majorities that
produce them, and the corresponding swing votes. We posit that the placement
of the majorities in a circle is more instructive than their placement in a
parliament-like semicircle, which produces artificial extremes that are absent
from the data. In the same context, we also develop tools to identify visually
different alignments of a supreme court's justices in different legal subject
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1. This article builds on previously published work analyzing the judicial coalitions that
formed in tightly split decisions of the United States and Indiana Supreme Courts - the 5-4 and 3-2
opinions issued by those respective courts. Frank Sullivan, Jr., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, &
Dimitri Georgakopoulos, The Fluidity of Judicial Coalitions: A Surprising Look at Coalitions
within the Supreme Courts of the United States and Indiana, JUDICATURE, Autumn 2016, at 34, 36.
2. This follows our earlier approach of defining a particular court by using the time period
during which the composition of the court is unchanged. This approach is explained in further detail
in Sullivan, Jr., Georgakopoulos, & Georgakopoulos, supra note 1, at 36.
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matters (i.e., topics or areas of law). We note that this resulting image of
adjudication is markedly unlike what would appear if the median voter theorem
applied.
We are not aware of any prior attempt to visualize voluminous supreme court
data besides illustrations of the ideological position of justices. 3 By contrast,
many have identified swing votes with even scientific rigor and many have tried
to identify differential attitudes of the United States Supreme Court by legal
subject matter. Out of a vast expanse of literature, some milestones may be
Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the
United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C.L. REv. 1275 (2005) (studying the voting
of Justice O'Connor as the median justice) and Mark Klock, Cooperation and
Division: An Empirical Analysis of Voting Similarities and Differences During
the Stable Rehnquist Court Era-1994 to 2005, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
537 (2013) (studying details of what we term the Breyer composition). Others
study the voting of justices on specific subject matters, for example, Lewis M.
Wasserman and James C. Hardy, U.S. Supreme Court Justices' Religious and
Party Affiliation, Case-Level Factors, Decisional Era and Voting in
Establishment Clause Disputes Involving Public Education: 1947-2012, 2 BRIT.
J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 111 (2013) (studying the votes about the establishment
clause in school finance cases). Others have studied the effect of unexpected
features of the system, such as the bias of the Republican Party toward appointing
younger justices, Jonathan N. Katz and Matthew L. Spitzer, What's Age Got to
Do with It? Supreme Court Appointees and the Long Run Location of the
Supreme Court Median Justice, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 41 (2014) (with a detailed
discussion of the median justice theory and variations of it; supporting eighteen-
year staggered terms for justices). One research method examines all coalitions
to identify the median justice, Paul H. Edelman and Jim Chen, The Most
Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 63 (1996). Our approach stands in contrast to attempts to identify a single
justice as the swing vote because (a) we reveal all the swing votes; and (b) several
swing votes are visibly material.
II. VISUALIZING THE INDIANA DATA (1999-2010)
Visualizing swing votes requires locating the output of the majorities
connected by that swing vote. For example, consider two tight majorities of the
five-member Indiana Supreme Court we study, that of Boehm-Rucker-Sullivan
and that of Shepard-Boehm-Dickson. The swing vote connecting them is that of
3. The two illustrations of ideological positions of justices that stand out are from Martin
& Quinn and Bailey, with additional such graphics in other publications by Bailey. See Andrew D.
Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the
U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 PoL. ANAL. 134 (2002); Michael A. Bailey, Measuring Court
Preferences, 1950-2011: Agendas, Polarity and Heterogeneity (Working Paper, August 2012). See
also Wikipedia, Ideological Leanings of U.S. Supreme Court Justices (as of Sept. 28, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/7LCZ-K6HM].
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Boehm. To display Boehm's swing vote, we must place the two majorities that
it connects. Majorities that do not correspond to tight splits we consider
irrelevant, because the majority needs to lose more than one vote for a swing to
materialize in the outcome.
A swing vote may be motivated by a myriad of concerns. Deducing these is
part of what makes the examination of swing votes interesting. We cannot impose
a structure a priori; that structure must arise from the data if it exists.
Nevertheless, a gauge is necessary to guide the placement of the majorities. In
view of the dominant political division between right and left ("political slant" in
our parlance), we start with that as our gauge. Rather than obscuring other
motivations of swing votes, we find that using this gauge to arrange the majorities
reveals additional motivations for swing votes. Political slant is also convenient
because nearly all issues translate to political positions. Motivations unrelated to
political concerns surely exist, but we do not think that locating the majorities by
political slant obscures them. For example, although textualism has recently been
associated with the right, left-wing textualists exist, such as Professor Akhil
Amar. Thus, the concern, for example, would be that justices who are textualists
and lean left may ally themselves due to textualism with textualists who lean
right. Because we enter the substance of the opinions of coalitions, we do observe
such instances of coalitions formed for unrelated reasons.4
That we use political slant to arrange the majorities does not mean that a court
should look like a legislature, with the far right seen as the polar opposite of the
far left. Rather, the arrangement should enable coalitions motivated by similar
reasons formed by justices of opposing political ideology to appear.
A well-known criminal law decision of the United States Supreme Court
provides an example. In Apprendi v. New Jersey (a case recognizing a right to a
jury determination of any fact that increases a penalty above the statutory
4. An Indiana example may be found in attitudes toward appellate review of criminal
sentences. Unlike some members of the court who considered appellate review of sentences to
impinge upon the prerogative of the court of first instance, e.g., Frye v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1012,
1015 (Ind. 2005) (Dickson, J., dissenting), and Scheckel v. State, 655 N.E.2d 506, 511 (Ind. 1995)
(Dickson, J., dissenting), Shepard (appointed by a Republican governor) and Sullivan (appointed
by a Democratic governor) were both open to such requests for review but each articulated a
different justification for being so. Shepard was of the view that too high a barrier to appellate
review of sentences runs "the risk of impinging on another constitutional right contained in Article
7, that the Supreme Court's rules shall 'provide in all cases an absolute right to one appeal."' Serino
v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. 2003) (quoting IND. CONST. art. VII, § 6). Sullivan looked to
the fact that the same constitutional amendment that authorized appellate judges to review and
revise sentences was the constitutional amendment that insulated appellate judges from partisan
elections and concluded that the review and revise authority is intended, at least in part, to temper
decisions of trial judges whose decisions are sometimes reviewed at the ballot box. Frank Sullivan,
Jr., Selected Developments in Indiana Criminal Sentencing and Death Penalty Law (1993-2012),
49 IND. L. REV. 1349, 1362 (2016).
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maximum),5 the five-justice majority consisted of liberals Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg and conservatives Scalia and Thomas. Placing the Apprendi coalition
in a circle makes more sense than placing it in a parliamentary semicircle. The
circular placement of the coalitions preserves the principle that swing votes
connect opposing views on different grounds. We try to make swing votes appear
as close to the diameter of the circle as possible, whereas in a parliamentary
arrangement of the majorities, although some swing votes would connect
opposing ends of the spectrum, others would connect apparently centrist factions.
We feel that this would obscure differences in the latter cases.6
We recognize that the assignment of political slant may be debatable,
inconclusive, and, occasionally, a gross oversimplification. Nevertheless, it
illuminates the graphs and the analysis. Reasonable people might disagree on a
few percentage points of assignment of political slant. Still, the assignment of a
slant for the vast majority of opinions is uncontested. Our assignment of slants
should be taken with this caveat. However, even if a reader were to disagree with
even 5 percent of our slant assignments, the essence of the graphs and the
dynamics they reveal remain unchanged.
Guided by political slant, we produce the figure for the Indiana court
essentially deterministically. We place the most conservative coalition on the
farthest right of the circle, at the three o'clock position, and the most liberal
coalition of the farthest left, at the nine o'clock position. We place the next most
liberal above the previously placed one, and then below it, while preserving
opposition in swing votes. Vice-versa, the next most conservative coalition we
place below the most conservative one. Appendix A explains the process in
detail.
We illustrate each opinion as an extension of a narrow central angle or thick
radius of the circle of the majorities - akin to a very thin slice of a large donut-
shaped pizza. As the majority that issues the greatest number of opinions issues
thirty-five opinions, the one-tenth segment of the circle that corresponds to each
majority divided by thirty-five produces the arc, the space to which each opinion
can correspond. We illustrate conservative opinions as dark gray (or red in the
online version) and liberal opinions in hexagonal shading (or blue in the online
version), separated by black lines on the outside of the circle.' For example, the
Shepard-Dickson-Rucker majority that appears at the two-o'clock position
5. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6. A vivid example of this is in the separation of sentencing from tort opinions of the
Indiana court. If we had used a semicircular parliamentary figure, then one of the two would appear
to be more a dispute between extremes than the other. This is obviously false. Rather, the court
separated itself about tort issues in a different way than it separated itself about sentencing issues.
Neither contrast is greater than the other. Rather, they are different, but important, contrasts that
the circular arrangement preserves, whereas a parliamentary arrangement would subordinate one.
7. By using red for conservative and blue for liberal in the online version, we follow the
practice of the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States, which is the opposite to
much of the world, with the UK, e.g., having Labour use red and the Conservatives use blue. We
lighten both the red and blue hues for readability.
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issued two liberal opinions and seven conservative ones. Because the liberal side
of the circle is toward the left, the nine o'clock position, we gather each
majority's liberal opinions on the left side. The result is figure 1.
The liberal opinions are fifty, exactly one-third of the 150. Appendix B has
tables with all the opinions per majority, our one-sentence summary of majority
and dissent, and our coding of each opinion in a legal subject matter and as liberal
or conservative.
By virtue of placing the next most liberal majority above the most liberal one
and the next most conservative below the most conservative one, the figure has
a slight clockwise bias compared to an ideal where the majorities adjacent to the
extremes are equally less extreme or to other arrangements.' Nevertheless, we
draw comfort that the resulting illustration shows that this arrangement is quite
accurate a sorting of the majorities from conservative to liberal. Generally,
moving from the conservative three o'clock position toward the liberal nine
o'clock position, either counterclockwise from above or clockwise from below,
increases the proportion of liberal opinions.
8. An alternative approach would be to place the next most extreme majority above the most
extreme one on both sides of the circle. This would not produce by design the bias, but it would
erode the oppositional nature of the graph. By contrast, the method that we use preserves opposition
by having the next most extreme majorities on opposite sides of the circle (rather than at the two
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Figure 1. The swing votes and the 150 opinions, conservative (dark gray or red in the online version) and
liberal (hexagonal shading or blue in the online version), placed at their majorities.
We also draw confidence in this approach because each majority shares two
justices with each of its neighbors. Thus, judicial outlook should tend to change
gradually. This is an important advantage of the circular representation of the
majorities that would be lost in other arrangements, such as a parliamentary
layout in a semicircle. A five-member court that has three-member majorities in
tightly split opinions would be the largest that can be represented in a circle
retaining this feature of gradual change by one justice at a time.
The absence of dominant swing votes is apparent in figure 1. In contrast to
9. In the subsequent article of this series, we find no composition of the United States
Supreme Court that provides sufficient data for a similarly deterministic placement of its majorities.
If a nine-member or a seven-member supreme court did provide enough data, the proper
representation of its majorities that would retain their gradually changing nature may be possible
in more dimensions.
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the dominant swing vote of Kennedy in recent compositions of the United States
Supreme Court, no swing votes tend to predominate. This first approach to these
opinions reveals a court that aligns itself in many majorities to issue tightly split
opinions. In a prior publication, we calculated an index of the fluidity of a court's
coalitions, where this court did indeed produce a high index of fluidity, which is
consistent with what we observe here.10
III. CENTERS OF GRAVITY
Consider the difference of a court that issues mixed liberal and conservative
opinions from various majorities, as does this composition of the Indiana
Supreme Court, from a court with a single dominant swing vote. Weighted
centers of gravity of liberal and conservative opinions produce a visualization of
this difference. If all the liberal opinions came from one majority, say at nine
o'clock, then the center of gravity of the liberal opinions would be that nine
o'clock point. As the majorities that are sources of liberal opinions spread around
the circle, the weights of the opinions at those corresponding points join the
calculation of the center of gravity and move it toward the center of the circle.
A. All Opinions
The centers of gravity of the liberal and the conservative opinions are quite
far from any specific majorities. Figure 2 illustrates the centers of gravity, liberal
and conservative, of all tightly split opinions. The figure draws a heavy line that
connects the conservative and liberal centers of gravity. Whereas in a court with
a single dominant swing vote, that line would track the line that corresponds to
that swing vote, in this court this line is much closer to connecting points that are
about in the middle of each semicircle. Also, the relatively frequent formation of
the majorities at seven and eight o'clock, Shepard-Boehm-Sullivan and
Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan, pull the line a little in that direction rather than the
line appearing at the center of the graph.
We do not propose a theory about where the ideal line that connects the
centers of gravity of a court should be; this depends on one's views about how
gradually the change from conservative to liberal opinions coming from each
majority should occur and the ideal composition of the extremes at nine and three
o'clock, including whether they should not produce opinions of only one political
slant. If the three o'clock majority produced a few more conservative opinions
than the nine o'clock majority, and the proportion increased gradually and equally
along both the top and the bottom parts of the circle, then the line connecting
those centers of gravity should be fairly short, in the center of the graph, and
almost horizontal. We actually observe a variation of this hypothesis when we
focus on the other opinions (i.e., not tort; not criminal procedure; and not
sentencing, professional responsibility, nor criminal law opinions) in figure 6,
where we see a very short line connecting the centers of gravity.
10. Sullivan, Georgakopoulos & Georgakopoulos, supra note 1, at 36.
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If the mix of opinions at the extreme opposites, at nine and three o'clock,
were of only one slant but the intermediate majorities produced gradually
changing mixes of liberal and conservative opinions, then the ends of the line
should be at about the center of each semicircle. The two small points on the
central line of the figure, the line of Boehm as the central swing vote, illustrate
the ends of such a line."
Our knowledge of the details of the opinions enables us to focus on subsets
of opinions, perhaps revealing a more precise alignment of the justices by subject
matter. We observe three broad categories and a fourth residual category. Broadly
speaking, the three categories regard tort, criminal procedure, and sentencing.
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Figure 2. The opinions with a heavy line connecting the liberal and conservative centers of gravity.
11. The assumptions that produce those points are that the mix of each type of opinion,
liberal or conservative, increases by 20 percent with each majority, going from 100 percent to zero
at the two opposite sides of the graph.
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B. The Tort Opinions
Although Criminal Procedure seems extremely well represented in this
sample of opinions, the largest number of opinions comes from a subset about
liability between private entities, what we characterize (without complete
precision) as "tort opinions." The tort opinions are 47 or 31 percent of the full set
of 150 opinions. Of those, 13 we consider liberal, 28 percent of the tort opinions.
The corresponding illustration of the tort opinions is figure 3. The thick line
connects the centers of gravity of the conservative and the liberal majorities and
is quite different from that of the prior figure.
We perceive figure 3 as significantly different from the prior figure of all the
opinions and especially the subsequent figures of other subject matters. Once the
focus of attention narrows to tort opinions, a single conservative majority appears
to dominate, that of Shepard-Boehm-Sullivan at about the seven o'clock
position. The liberal opinions are few. Many of the liberal opinions come from
majorities separated by one swing vote from the one above, from the majority
Dickson-Rucker-Sullivan at ten o'clock from the swing of Sullivan, but mostly
from the majority of Boehm-Dickson-Rucker at eleven o'clock from the swing
of Boehm. Boehm appears as an important swing vote, but between two different
majorities than those that appeared most opposed while the focus was on all
opinions.
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Figure 3. The opinions about private liability ("tort") and line connecting their centers of gravity.
C. The Criminal Procedure Opinions
The next largest grouping of opinions is about criminal procedure, 42
opinions or 28 percent of the sample of 150 opinions. Of those we consider nine
to be liberal, 21 percent. Figure 4 illustrates the criminal procedure opinions
following the same methods. The thick line connects the centers of gravity of
liberal and conservative opinions.
Again, the figure reveals a very different pattern than that of tort opinions.
The conservative opinions do not come from a single dominant majority; two
majorities produce more than their share but do not dominate. Conservative
opinions also come from majorities that were not very conservative in the overall
mix of opinions, from Boehm-Dickson-Rucker at eleven o'clock, and from
Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan at eight o'clock. The slope of the line connecting the
centers of gravity of liberal and conservative opinions is very different from the
slope of the corresponding tort line that we saw in the previous figure. The
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reliably conservative vote is Shepard's and the reliably liberal vote is Rucker's.
























Figure 4. The criminal procedure opinions and line connecting their centers of gravity.
D. The Sentencing Opinions
The last significant grouping of opinions comes from the conglomeration of
opinions we characterize as "sentencing" although the grouping is comprised of
cases not only about sentencing but also sanctions against violations of
professional responsibility by attorneys or judges, and criminal law. Those add
up to 38 opinions, i.e., 25 percent of the entire set of 150. Seventeen we identify
as liberal, 44 percent. Figure 5 illustrates them following the same methods. The




































Figure 5. The sentencing, professional responsibility, and criminal law opinions of the Rucker court and
the line connecting their centers of gravity.
Notice that although the line connecting the centers of gravity has about the
same slope as in criminal procedure, it is shorter, reflecting the fact that both the
conservative and the liberal majorities of the sentencing opinions are more
scattered than they were in criminal procedure. Even more than in the prior
figures, no dominant majorities and no dominant swing votes emerge.
Surprisingly, the majority that forms the most often, that of
Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan at the eight o'clock position, issues opinions of both
liberal and conservative slants (in an eight-to-three ratio or 73 percent liberal).
That same majority that appears mostly liberal here appears mostly conservative
in tort and in criminal procedure and evenly split overall.
. The Remaining Opinions
Twenty-four opinions remain outside the above three categories or 16 percent
of the set of 150 opinions. By area of law they divide into two groups of seven,
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Figure 6. The remaining opinions of the Rucker court and the line connecting their centers of gravity.
Seven opinions involve the administration of the state and the courts (three
liberal).' Of those, four come from the majority of Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan at
12. Hughes v. City of Gary, 741 N.E.2d 1168 (Ind. 2001) (denying challenge by minority of
city council to majority's project; majority: Shepard-Boehm-Dickson; conservative); Nw. Sch.
Corp. v. Linke, 763 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002) (allowing drug testing of students in various settings;
majority: Shepard-Dickson-Sullivan; conservative); Ind. State Univ. v. LaFief, 888 N.E.2d 184
(Ind. 2008) (non-reappointment of professor triggers unemployment benefits, dissent would have
considered employment for term; majority: Shepard-Boehm-Sullivan; liberal); City of Gary v. Ind.
Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2000) (allowing city to impose fees on use of its property by
telecommunications company; majority: Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan; liberal); Noble Cty. v. Rogers,
745 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. 2001) (landowner's counterclaim against county for not granting license
properly barred; majority: Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan; liberal as pro-municipality); Fackler v.
Powell, 839 N.E.2d 165 (Ind. 2005) (marital dissolution court retains jurisdiction to interpret
mortgage assigned by the decree, dissent would assign to local court; majority:
Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan; conservative for preventing forum-shopping); St. Joseph Cty. Comm'rs
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the eight o'clock position, and one each from the majorities at the three, four, and
seven o'clock positions. Seven opinions involve real estate (two liberal).1 3 Four
involve family law (half liberal)." Four opinions regard state tax (three liberal). 5
And some are unique (two opinions, one liberal).16 The liberal ones are 11, or 46
v. Nemeth, 929 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2010) (in dispute between county and probate court, approves
cost-cutting renovations, denies salary increases, remands on land sale, dissent concurs in all except
land sale, would affirm lower court which vacated mandate not to sell without court's consent;
majority: Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan; conservative as pro-judge).
13. 600 Land, Inc. v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Marion Cty., 889 N.E.2d 305 (Ind.
2008) (not requiring special permit for solid waste station at truck stop; majority:
Dickson-Rucker-Sullivan; conservative); Tippecanoe Assocs. l v. Kimco Lafayette 671, Inc., 829
N.E.2d 512 (Ind. 2005) (finding unenforceable restrictive covenant to prevent lease to competitor
when original lessee subleases property for different use; majority: Boehm-Dickson-Rucker;
liberal); Myers v. Leedy, 915 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 2009) (lessee retains lease despite voiding of
transfer to lessor because initial transferor did not join lessor; majority: Boehm-Dickson-Rucker;
liberal); Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. 2005) (denying adverse possession due to
nonpayment of some taxes; majority: Shepard-Boehm-Dickson; conservative); Villas W. II of
Willowridge Homeowners Assn v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274 (Ind. 2008) (reversing disparate
impact striking of prohibition by HOA against leasing; majority: Shepard-Boehm-Dickson;
conservative); Turley v. Hyten, 772 N.E.2d 993 (Ind. 2002) (landlord keeps deposit of destructive
tenant despite not complying with some notice requirements; majority: Shepard-Boehm-Sullivan;
conservative); State v. Kimco of Evansville, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206 (Ind. 2009) (reconfiguration of
roads through shopping mall not a taking; majority: Shepard-Boehm-Sullivan; conservative).
14. King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 2005) (allowing same-sex partner to seek parental
rights; majority: Boehm-Rucker-Sullivan; liberal); Vadas v. Vadas, 762 N.E.2d 1234 (Ind. 2002)
(husband's father's house not marital property despite plans; majority- Shepard-Dickson-Rucker;
conservative); Neal v. DeKalb Cty. Div. of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280 (Inc. 2003)
(allowing mother to reverse termination of parental rights she had signed; majority:
Shepard-Dickson-Rucker; liberal); Grant v. Hager, 868 N.E.2d 801 (Ind. 2007) (allowing payment
of child support by custodial parent to noncustodial; majority: Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan;
conservative).
15. Ind. Dep't of State Revenue v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-Am., ACA, 734 N.E.2d 551
(Ind. 2000) (federal agricultural credit association not subject to tax of long term mortgage interest
but taxed on short term, dissent would tax all; majority: Shepard-Dickson-Rucker; conservative);
Ind. Dep't of Revenue v. Kitchin Hospitality, LLC, 907 N.E.2d 997 (Ind. 2009) (denying hotel's
argument for tax exemption and reversing specialized tax court which dissent would affirm;
majority: Shepard-Boehm-Sullivan; liberal); State v. Adams, 762 N.E.2d 728 (Ind. 2002)
(improperly found cocaine can still be taxed; majority Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan; liberal as pro-
government); Ind. Dep't of State Revenue v. Belterra Resort Ind., LLC, 935 N.E.2d 174 (Ind. 2010)
(acquisition of riverboat subject to sales tax as retail transaction; majority:
Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan; liberal as pro-government).
16. Pabey v. Pastrick, 816 N.E.2d 1138 (Ind. 2004) (ordering special election in disputed
mayoral election; majority: Shepard-Dickson-Rucker; liberal); Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v.
Martin, 765 N.E.2d 1238 (Ind. 2002) (HS player not allowed to play for new school but appeal did
not violate injunction, dissent would have allowed athlete to play; majority:
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percent, of the remaining opinions, giving this subset the highest ratio of liberal
opinions. Figure 6 illustrates them.
The problem with Figure 6 is that the data are thinning out. Each majority
issues a few opinions. Several majorities issue both liberal and conservative
opinions. The line connecting the centers of gravity is short, reflecting the notion
that the court's majorities are very fluid, and do not group themselves
systematically in the sense that liberal and conservative opinions come from
many majorities in a way very different from the arrangement of the majorities
on the basis of their overall leanings.
In sum, centers of gravity reveal two features. Their distance (the length of
the line) increases with polarization. The observation that the lines corresponding
to different subject matters have different slopes shows that the justices form
systematically different coalitions by subject matter.
IV. CONCLUSION
The graphical representations of the tightly split opinions open several
avenues for further research, some of which we are pursuing. One can try to apply
this analysis to the United States Supreme Court and observe how its patterns
change over time. The focus on swing votes may also allow further elaboration
of the allocation of opinion authorship and the relative importance of different
justices as swing votes for the advocates. One could also use this analysis as a
stepping stone for juxtaposing actual judging with locational models of judicial
voting based on the median voter theorem.
This analysis may also be relevant to the debates about efficiency of the
common law and the victory rate of plaintiffs. The argument about the efficiency
of the common law springs from the idea that interpretations that produce
problems will attract litigation, and therefore be more likely to change. However,
the dominance of criminal procedure and criminal law in the docket of the
Indiana Supreme Court suggests that other forces predominate. Turning to the
rate of victory, the data are not directly relevant, because the disputes are filtered
by the Court's decision to review a matter, akin to the granting of certiorari. The
result of this filtering, however, is not an even split between liberal and
conservative outcomes, as one might expect, but skew conservative; strikingly
almost 80 percent in criminal procedure, and over 70 percent in tort.
This graphical sojourn over supreme court swing votes sounds an upbeat
note. The Indiana Supreme Court used most of its majorities and most of its
majorities produced both liberal and conservative opinions. The upbeat message
is that, rather than political leanings, law or, rather, the justices' personal legal
philosophies, mattered in the disposition of disputes that produced tight splits.
Personal legal philosophies, in other words, visibly dominated political leanings.
The court aligned differently for matters of civil liability (what we called "tort")
than on other matters, especially criminal procedure.
Shepard-Boehm-Sullivan; conservative).
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APPENDIX A: THE INDIANA DATA AND THE PLACEMENT OF THE MAJORITIES
1. THE DATA
The Indiana data begin as the 174 opinions identified as 3-2, "tightly split,"
opinions in our previous joint work. 7 These are the tightly split opinions issued
by the unchanged composition of the Indiana Supreme Court from 1999 to 2010,
the composition defined by the junior justice being Rucker. The difficulty of
generalizing from this data becomes clearer if we juxtapose those 174 opinions
to the 191 tightly split opinions of the Breyer composition, the United States
Supreme Court from November 1994, to June 2005. Seventy-two percent of those
191 opinions, 141 opinions, come from three coalitions that are separated by two
swing votes, Kennedy and O'Connor. The minority in 46 percent of that total has
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens. The other two groups have these
justices in the majority, joined by either O'Connor, in thirty-one opinions, or
Kennedy, in twenty-two opinions.
The opinions of the Indiana court do not allow such an easy identification of
its swing votes. The tightly split opinions that we study come from nine
majorities (out of the possible ten for a five-member court), each in significant
proportions. A listing of the Indiana tightly split opinions, a one-sentence
summary, and their subject matter and political slant appear in Appendix B.
We explain here how we produced figure 1 of the main text.
2. ARRANGING THE MAJORITIES
We arrange the majorities in a circle in such a way as to observe the
opposition of majorities separated by a single swing vote. Having coded the
opinions as liberal or conservative ourselves by comparing the position of the
majority with that of the dissent, we identified the two most contrary majorities,
defined as the one that issued the highest percentage of conservative opinions and
one that issued the highest percentage of liberal opinions.
One majority issues 100 percent conservative opinions. Two majorities issue
100 percent liberal opinions, but as one opinion of one of these majorities is
borderline conservative, we use the other majority as the most liberal one. Since
these are tightly split opinions, the most liberal majority and the most
conservative one must share a justice. The majority that produces only
conservative opinions is Shepard, Boehm, and Dickson; Rucker, with Sullivan,
form the dissent. The most liberal majority is Boehm, Rucker, and Sullivan;
17. Sullivan, Georgakopoulos & Georgakopoulos, supra note 1. The opinions were compiled
by Dimitri Georgakopoulos from Table D of the annual Examination of the Indiana Supreme Court
Docket, Dispositions, and Voting, compiled under the direction of Kevin W. Betz (1999-2004) and
Mark J. Crandley (2005-20 10) and assisted by P. Jason Stephenson and other authors and published
by the Indiana Law Review in vols. 33-44 (2000-2011), respectively.
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Shepard, with Dickson, form the dissent.' 8 The swing vote is Boehm.
Bochm Shepard




Figure Al. Placing the two most ideologically opposed majorities in the circle of all ten possible
majorities.
Because the ideological opposition of these two coalitions is the sharpest, we
consider their opposition the most salient. Accordingly, we begin the arrangement
of the majorities by placing those two on opposite sides and connect them with
a line marked Boehm as the swing vote that links them. We place the
conservative Shepard-Boehm-Dickson majority at the (rightmost) three o'clock
position and the liberal Boehm-Rucker-Sullivan majority across it, at the nine
o'clock position. Since the possible majorities are ten, each side of the circle has
five positions, two above and two below each one of these two majorities, as in
figure Al.
As each majority has three justices, each of these two most ideologically
opposed majorities that are separated by the swing vote of Boehm has two other
potential swing votes. Because the objective is to illustrate the opposition
between majorities that are separated by a swing vote, the majorities that result
from those swing votes should also be across the circle. For example, from the
majority Shepard-Boehm-Dickson, the other swing votes are Shepard and
Dickson, forming the majorities Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan and
Dickson-Rucker-Sullivan. We place the majority that issued the greater
proportion of liberal opinions in the position above the already placed
18. A second majority, Dickson-Rucker-Sullivan, also issues only liberal opinions but we
consider this majority as less saliently liberal than Boehm-Rucker-Sullivan because it forms less
often. Also, some of its opinions have only a marginally liberal slant. Transposing those two
majorities would not alter any of the phenomena we discuss except the rotational symmetry of
figure A3.
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oppositional majority and the other one below

























Figure A2. Placing the next four opposing majorities.
Four positions (points) remain without an assigned majority in figure A2.
Three majorities that have issued opinions remain unplaced; one potential
majority never formed to issue any opinions. Since we broke the tie placing the
more liberal majorities above the first two, we also place the next most liberal
majority, Boehm-Dickson-Rucker, upwards, at the eleven o'clock position, the
first position on the left half of the circle above those already occupied. Two of
its swing votes are already placed, the swing of Dickson to
Shepard-Dickson-Sullivan at the four o'clock position, and that of Rucker to
Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan at the eight o'clock position. The remaining swing vote
is Boehm and the resulting majority, Shepard-Boehm-Sullivan, still unplaced,
goes to the lower end of the circle to stress opposition. A single majority that has
issued opinions remains unplaced, Shepard-Boehm-Rucker. Its placement seems
to be more natural at the one o'clock position, where it shares two justices with
both its neighbors. This leaves the five o'clock position for the majority that
issued no opinions, Boehm-Dickson-Sullivan. Figure A3 shows the result.
Interestingly, the resulting star-like diagram has symmetry. Flipping the
diagram along its horizontal centrally dividing line, the line that corresponds to
Boehm as the main swing vote, produces the same shape.
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Figure A3. The web of all majorities and swing votes.
The purpose of arranging the majorities is to be able to visualize the opinions.
Having arranged the ten possible majorities in opposition around a circle,
each one of the ten points that correspond to each majority is the point at which
its opinions should appear. Figure 1 illustrates the 150 opinions that remain in the
sample after we drop several that we do not consider orthodox tightly split
opinions. Most of the dropped opinions involve concurrences rather than dissents.
Some, however, we consider atypical because the two dissenting justices take
positions ideologically opposite from each other, making the majority position the
centrist one.' 9
19. A typical example is In re Fieger, 887 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. 2008) (per curiam). The opinion
is about professional responsibility and imposes a temporary ban from temporary admission to the
Indiana Bar on a lawyer from a different jurisdiction. One dissent would permanently ban the
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APPENDIX B: TABLES OF OPINIONS PER MAJORITY
We list the opinions in the sample in nine tables, by majority, starting with
Boehm-Rucker-Sullivan, the most liberal majority at the nine o'clock position
of the figures and proceeding clockwise. The first column contains the opinion
and its citation. The second column contains our extremely brief (and admittedly
almost cryptic) summary of the majority and the dissent. The third column
contains our coding, i.e., either our categorization of the area of law of the
opinion and the liberal or conservative slant of the majority compared to the
dissent or that the opinion was dropped from the sample. We underscore that the
political slant of the opinion is the result of the comparison of the majority to the
dissent. In the few cases where two dissents take political positions on either side
of the majority, we drop the opinion because the outcome of the majority is the
centrist one. The ordering of the justices in each majority is, first, the chief
justice, and then the associate justices alphabetically.
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A. Boehm-Rucker-Sullivan (Nine o'Clock Position)
In re Miller, 730
N.E.2d 171 (Ind. 2000)
(per curiam).
Ashabraner v. Bowers,
753 N.E.2d 662 (Ind.
2001) (Sullivan, J.).
In re Harshey, 740
N.E.2d 851 (Ind. 2001)
(per curiam).
Azania v. State, 778
N.E.2d 1253 (Ind.
2002) (Boehm, J.).
King v. S.B., 837
N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 2005)
(Sullivan, J.).
Halsema v. State, 823
N.E.2d 668 (Ind. 2005)
(Rucker, J.).
Sellmer v. State, 842
N.E.2d 358 (Ind. 2006)
(Sullivan, J.).
Stephenson v. State,
864 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind.
2007) (Boehm, J.).




P.C. v. Krueger, 882
N.E.2d 723 (Ind. 2008)
(Boehm, J.).
Lawyer suspension of lyr for being paid out of
client funds was warranted. Dissent considers the
sanction insufficient.
Negligence jury trial, use of peremptory
challenges racially discriminatory. Dissent would
uphold trial court's denial of discrimination.
Atty reprimanded for causing acceptance of
settlement client rejected. Dissent considers
sanction insufficient.
Death penalty; sentence vacated. Dissents find
jury selection and composition appropriate..
Same-sex partner can seek parental rights.
Dissent 1 thinks this can be challenged later in
proceedings; dissent 2 would dismiss for failing
to state a claim.
Meth possession; lessee could not consent to
search, metric measurement of drugs confusing to
the jury. Dissent finds lessee's consent sufficient.
Marijuana possession; anonymous call not
grounds for reasonable suspicion, car search
needed proper warning. Dissent finds the
suspicion reasonable.
Burglary conviction; errors harmless.
Concurrence underlines experience and resources
of defense.
Attorney's 3yr suspension with readmission
subject to conditions appropriate. Dissents would
disbar.
Podiatrist move escaped reasonable limits of
















State ex rel. Ind. State
Police v. Arnold, 906
N.E.2d 167 (Ind. 2009)
(Sullivan, J.).




Expungement is possible over State's objection.
Only 1 dissent, would not expunge.
Plea needs proper warnings, prospective




B. Dickson-Rucker-Sullivan (Ten o'Clock Position)
In re Loosemore, 771
N.E.2d 1154 (Ind.
2002) (per curiam).
Smith v. State, 770
N.E.2d 818 (Ind. 2002)
(Rucker, J.).
Embry v. O'Bannon,
798 N.E.2d 157 (Ind.
2003) (Dickson, J.).







N.E.2d 901 (Ind. 2004)
(Sullivan, J.).
State v. Bulington, 802
N.E.2d 435 (Ind. 2004)
(Sullivan, J.).
Sees v. Bank One Ind.,
N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154
(Ind. 2005) (Rucker,
J.).
Attorney discipline; 3-year suspension with req'd
SCt reinstatement petition proper. Dissent would
disbar.
Guilty but mentally ill murder and side crimes;
resentence 111yr consecutive sentence. Dissents
would affirm, reducing weight of mental issues
and weighing more aggravating factors.
Funding of dual-enrollment of religious students
did not violate constitution. Concurrences would
impose some limits that the majority seems not
to.
Remands dismissed medical malpractice suit for
trial. Dissent 1 would not allow affidavits from
dead people to influence SJ motions. Dissent 2
agrees a material fact would exist but movant
gave opportunity to get affidavit from a new
doctor and p'f failed so should lose.
Denies arbitration between contractors. Dissent
would apply the AIA contract form and arbitrate
as routinely done.
Store testimony that defendant bought a few
boxes of antihistamines not reasonable suspicion
for search. Dissent sees reasonable suspicion.
Statutory interpretation of Lender Liability Act,












600 Land, Inc. v.
Metro. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals of Marion
Cty, 889 N.E.2d 305
(Ind. 2008) (Sullivan,
J.).
Watts v. State, 885
N.E.2d 1228 (Ind.
2008) (Sullivan, J.).
B.W. & W.G. v. D.B.
& J.B., 908 N.E.2d
586 (Ind. 2009)
(Dickson, J.).
ILLUSTRATING SWING VOTES I:
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
Solid waste transfer station at truck stop did not
need a special permit. Dissent would require a
permit.
Non-instruction on "sudden heat" involuntary
manslaughter was reversible error. Not per
dissent.
Father could revoke consent to adoption.
Concurrence asks for legislative clarification;







C. Boehm-Dickson-Rucker (Eleven o'Clock Position)
Cavinder Elevators,
Inc. v. Hall, 726
N.E.2d 285 (Ind. 2000)
(Dickson, J.).
Jiosa v. State, 755
N.E.2d 605 (Ind. 2001)
(Boehm, J.).
Segura v. State, 749




N.E.2d 899 (Ind. 2002)
(Boehm, J.).
Davidson v. State, 763
N.E.2d 441 (Ind. 2002)
(Boehm, J.).
Tort (fallen elevator); allows trial on later
discovered evidence. Dissent is procedural; the
fact that court ruled later than 30 days after
motion to correct should have been deemed a
denial, which movant should have appealed.
Error not to allow mother to testify in favor of
child molestation defendant. Dissent would not
allow testimony after violation of order
separating witnesses.
Not advising about deportation in cocaine plea
not reversible error. Concurrence explains burden
on the argument of ineffective assistance in pleas
but that would likely facilitate overturning pleas.
Allows prospective only application of
interpretation that time-barred products liability
claim. Dissent would deny rehearing.
Robbery and related crimes; no ineffective
assistance of counsel. Concurrence that no








Indep. Dep't of Envtl.
Mgmt. v. Twin Eagle
LLC, 798 N.E.2d 839
(Ind. 2003) (Boehm,
J.).













Dep't v. Guzorek, 857
N.E.2d 363 (Ind. 2006)
(Boehm, J.).




Newton v. State, 894
N.E.2d 192 (Ind. 2008)
(Dickson, J.).
Holly v. State, 918
N.E.2d 323 (Ind. 2009)
(Rucker, J.).
Myers v. Leedy, 915
N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 2009)
(Rucker, J.).
Clean Water Act dispute of developer against
state; IDEM may require permits, remand.
Concurrence sees matter not ripe, to the polluter's
advantage.
Glaucoma LASIC malpractice; limitations start
on discovery, remand. Dissents would time-bar
for different reasons.
Restrictive covenant to prevent lease to
competitor becomes unenforceable when tenant
subleases to different use. Dissent would apply as
written.
Stays execution pending SCOTUS reevaluation
of insanity standard. Dissents find defendant
would not meet the revised insanity standard and
would not stay.
Adding sheriffs department to defendant officer
relates back to original filing, not time-barred.
Dissent considers that it may not be a mistake of
identity and perhaps time-barred.
Trial court did not abuse discretion when it
replaced ex-wife & mother of children with
decedent's widow for pursuing wrongful death
claim. Concurrence would have ex-wife and her
attorney reimburse widow's legal fees.
Trial court lacked authority to accept belated
appeal of plea bargain. Concurrences & dissent.
While suspended license of owner would make
search pursuant to reasonable suspicion, the fact
that driver was opposite sex of registered owner
removed reasonableness, marijuana excluded.
Dissents argue request for license should not lead
to negative results for the police.
Lessee retains lease from transferee despite
voiding of transfer in favor of transferor because
transferor did not join transferee. Concurrence













In re Hawkins, 902
N.E.2d 231 (Ind. 2009)
(per curiam).
Klotz v. Hoyt, 900
N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2009)
(Dickson, J.).
Sheehan Constr. Co. v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., 935
N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 2010)
(Rucker, J.).
Baugh v. State, 933
N.E.2d 1277 (Ind.
2010) (Dickson, J.).
ILLUSTRATING SWING VOTES I:
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
Suspension of 60 days for a judge who neglected
postconviction orders. Dissents would suspend
longer.
Landlord notice to tenant about damages claims;
mostly pro-tenant. Concurrence would give
tenant more protection. Dissent would stick with
letter of law.
Insurance contract covers damage by
subcontractor. Dissents would bar or limit
recovery.
Sexually violent predator determination made
properly. Concurrence that he would have right to
cross expert but waived it.
D. Shepard-Boehm-Rucker (One o'Clock Position)
Bader v. Johnson, 732
N.E.2d 1212 (Ind.
2000) (Rucker, J.).
Baxter v. State, 727
N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 2000)
(Boehm, J.).
Hernandez v. State,
761 N.E.2d 845 (Ind.
2002) (Boehm, J.).
Crabtree ex rel. Kemp
v. Estate of Crabtree,
837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind.
2005) (Boehm, J.).
In re Fieger, 887
N.E.2d 87 (Ind. 2008)
(per curium).
Medical malpractice, late warning of fetus
defects, pro-liability. Concurrence agrees with
CofA (same result stricter test); dissent would not
grant the right to recover for loss of opportunity
and knowledge to decide to terminate pregnancy.
Murder sentence, conviction upheld, 65yrs
unreasonable, orders resentencing. Concurrences.
Murder conviction. Question by jury did not
violate procedures. Affirmed. Dissent 1 finds no
additional proceedings needed; dissent 2 would
not require defendant to show prejudice.
No punitive damages against deceased driver.
Insurance payments set off award. Dissents do
not find punitive damages precluded.
Attorney disciplinary issue. Improper disclosures
bar temporary admission for 2 yrs. One dissent














Tyler v. State, 903
N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2009)
(Boehm, J.).
Child molestation conviction with evidentiary
questions and consecutive sentence
enhancements of 30yrs for each. Conviction
upheld, resentencing ordered. Concurrence would
allow more freely videotaped testimony by
children. Dissent would not intrude on trial
court's sentencing.
. Shepard-Dickson-Rucker (Two o'Clock Position)
Ind. Dep't of State
Revenue v. Farm
Credit Servs. of Mid-
Am., ACA, 734
N.E.2d 551 (Ind. 2000)
(Shepard, C.J.).
In re Wilkins, 777
N.E.2d 714 (Ind. 2002)
(per curiam).
Saylor v. State, 765
N.E.2d 535 (Ind. 2002)
(Rucker, J.).
Vestal v. State, 773
N.E.2d 805 (Ind. 2002)
(Dickson, J.).
Bostick v. State, 773
N.E.2d 266 (Ind. 2002)
(Dickson, J.).
Vadas v. Vadas, 762
N.E.2d 1234 (Ind.
2002) (Shepard, C.J.).
Neal v. DeKalb Cty.




Pabey v. Pastrick, 816
N.E.2d 1138 (Ind.
2004) (Dickson, J.).
Taxation of federal agricultural credit association.
Not taxed for long-term mortgage interest, taxed
for short. Dissent, frustrated at Congressional
silence, would tax both.
Attorney disciplinary proceeding, 30-day
suspension warranted. Dissents would not
sanction, one sees challenged statement within
1st Amendment protection.
Death sentence postconviction appeal affirmed.
Dissent sees Apprendi applying and would
reverse the death sentence.
Burglary and theft convictions did not violate
double jeopardy. Concurrence about lack of
clarity of jury instruction.
Murder conviction appeal, incriminating
statements admissible; dissents would not admit
them.
Husband's father's house was not marital
property. Dissent would include it.
Allowed mother to reverse termination of
parental rights she had signed. Dissent would
adhere to precedent of not allowing easy opt-outs.
Mayoral election dispute; special election
justified. Dissent thinks a winner without
















v. Illinois Farmers Ins.




Ltd. v. Transcon. Ins.
Co., 885 N.E.2d 1235
(Ind. 2008) (Dickson,
J.).
ILLUSTRATING SWING VOTES I:
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
Assignment of insurance award to chiropractor
by victim was unenforceable. Dissent sees
assignment to healthcare providers as a desirable
exception to a policy of not allowing the
assignment of tort claims generally (to plaintiffs
lawyers, e.g.)
Client's excess insurer was not entitled to bring
legal malpractice action under doctrine of
equitable subrogation against law firms and
attorneys. Dissent argues subrogation against




F. Shepard-Boehm-Dickson (Three o'Clock Position)
Boggs v. Tri-State
Radiology, Inc., 730
N.E.2d 692 (Ind. 2000)
(Boehm, J.).
Dunlop v. State, 724
N.E.2d 592 (Ind. 2000)
(Dickson, J.).
Bacher v. State, 722
N.E.2d 799 (Ind. 2000)
(Dickson, J.).
Sanchez v. State, 749
N.E.2d 509 (Ind. 2001)
(Boehm, J.).
Query v. State, 745
N.E.2d 769 (Ind. 2001)
(Boehm, J.).
Hughes v. City of
Gary, 741 N.E.2d 1168
(Ind. 2001) (Shepard,
C.J.).
Medical malpractice of radiology equipment
manufacturer; short 2-year limitations period
upheld. Dissent would not bar claims that did not
manifest within two years.
Appeal of life w/o parole. Errors were harmless.
Dissent finds the mitigating factors stronger and
would reverse the sentence.
Murder conviction upheld. Victim impact
statement and lack of mitigation not grounds for
reversal. Dissent would sentence to 50 years
instead of 60.
Rape and confinement conviction upheld.
Prohibition on use of voluntary intoxication as a
defense against state of mind was constitutional.
Concurrence disagrees with elimination of
intoxication as a defense.
Motion to suppress seizure of cocaine, evidence
admissible. Dissent would require new warrant
upon pre-execution finding that found white
powder was innocent.
City council minority challenge to majority's
public works project, denied in accordance with
trial court's finding. Concurrence would apply
lighter standard but still require bond by












French v. State, 778
N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 2002)
(Boehm, J.).
In re Williams, 764
N.E.2d 613 (Ind. 2002)
(per curiam).
Tincher v. Davidson,
762 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind.
2002) (Dickson, J.).
Spivey v. State, 761
N.E.2d 831 (Ind. 2002)
(Dickson, J.).
Chaffee v. Seslar, 786
N.E.2d 705 (Ind. 2003)
(Dickson, J.).
State v. Barker, 809
N.E.2d 312 (Ind. 2004)
(Dickson, J.).
Myers v. State, 839
N.E.2d 1146 (Ind.
2005) (Dickson, J.).
Fraley v. Minger, 829
N.E.2d 476 (Ind. 2005)
(Dickson, J.).
Staton v. State, 853
N.E.2d 470 (Ind. 2006)
(Boehm, J.).
Habitual offender cocaine conviction appeal.
Conviction upheld. Dissent would reverse
habitual offender finding in part because
defendant appeared in prison orange to jury.
Attorney disbarment upheld. Dissent finds the
sanction too severe.
Tort liability, comparative negligence. Jury
miscalculations did not require that liability not
be imposed. Concurrence objects to the majority's
urging trial judges to assist juries.
Murder, burglary, & conspiracy to burglary;
double jeopardy not violated, convictions upheld.
Dissent would affirm first two but vacate
conspiracy because sole overt act was the
commission of the crime.
Medical malpractice, improper sterilization.
Preliminary determination that damages should
not include the cost of raising a healthy child
(reversing trial court and CA). Dissent 1 would
apply Restatement § 920; dissent 2 would include
those costs.
Death sentence interlocutory appeal. Potential
death sentence appropriate. Concurrence 1 would
remand for sentencing with limitations on
penalty; concurrence 2 would require the jury to
find aggravating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Meth possession appeal. Various pieces of
evidence were admissible. Concurrences with no
opinions.
Adverse possession dispute. Claimants complied
with all but tax requirements. Concurrence would
overrule precedent and follow tax rule. If about
courts' powers, then liberal.
Sexual misconduct with a minor; conviction
upheld. Dissent would reverse conviction on






















Jackson v. State, 868
N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 2007)
(Boehm, J.).
In re Benkie, 892
N.E.2d 1237 (Ind.
2008) (per curiam).
Bowles v. State, 891
N.E.2d 30 (Ind. 2008)
(Boehm, J.).
State v. Jackson, 889
N.E.2d 819 (Ind. 2008)
(Dickson, J.).
Belvedere v. State, 889
N.E.2d 286 (Ind. 2008)
(Boehm, J.).
Membres v. State, 889
N.E.2d 265 (Ind. 2008)
(Boehm, J.), reh'g
denied.






cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1527 (2009).
ILLUSTRATING SWING VOTES I:
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
Underpayment of employee. Correction w/in 14
days of Dep't of Labor determination cured error
and eliminated claim. Dissent would keep claim
alive.
Possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, no
errors, conviction upheld. Dissent finds defendant
did not properly waive the right to counsel.
Reprimand of attorneys upheld. Concurrence
agrees except for violation of provision on ad
using data for predicting success.
Cocaine dealing, motion to suppress. Evidence
was proper. Dissents would apply new rule
retroactively to the defendant's benefit and
exclude evidence.
Habitual traffic violator acquittal for lack of
specific knowledge for reason of license
revocation. State need not prove specific
knowledge. Dissent would require it as penalty
got much greater.
Drug trafficking conviction motion to suppress
defeated. Dissents would apply new
interpretation retroactively as in Membres v
State.
Marijuana use, motion to suppress, evidence
admissible. Dissent would apply new
interpretation retroactively (as dissent in
Belvedere v State).
Homeownrs Ass'n v. Homeowner to uphold
prohibition on leasing, Fair Housing Act,
discrimination. Not necessarily discriminatory.
Dissent would uphold lower courts that found






















926 N.E.2d 26 (Ind.
2010) (Boehm, J.).
Marijuana possession, evidence admissible.
Dissent disagrees with automobile exception and
would require a warrant.
Legal malpractice. Firm did not waive
limitations. Dissent sees limitations as an





G. Shepard-Dickson-Sullivan (Four o'Clock Position)
Azania v. State,
738 N.E.2d 248 (Ind.
2000) (Shepard, C.J.).
In re Bradburn, 739
N.E.2d 1074 (Ind.
2000) (Shepard, C.J.).
In re Capper, 757
N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 2001)
(per curiam).
Vitek v. State, 750
N.E.2d 346 (Ind. 2001)
(Sullivan, J.).
Zimmerman v. State,
750 N.E.2d 337 (Ind.
2001) (Dickson, J.).
Daniels v. State, 741
N.E.2d 1177 (Ind.
2001) (Shepard, C.J.).




State, 770 N.E.2d 810
(Ind. 2002) (Sullivan,
J.).
Death conviction for murder, third review, mostly
denied relief. Dissent 1 would find that a claim
was not waived; dissent 2 would explore
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Attorney misconduct affirmed, 30-day
suspension. Dissent would affirm lower penalty,
reprimand.
Attorney misconduct, reprimand justified.
Dissent would not find one count.
Murder conviction affirmed. Dissent would not
convict for murder but only lesser offenses due to
lack of proof of concerted action.
Prisoner's administrative complaint against
visitation removal for positive drug test; no right
of review. Concurrences clarify rights based on
statutory text and IN Constitution.
Murder conviction affirmed. No ineffective
assistance of counsel. Dissent favors accused.
Attorney miscdt, 6-month suspension affirmed.
Dissent would give 30-day suspension.
Medicaid fraud. Allowed defense that law was
insufficiently clear on criminally proscribed
behavior (charging more than customary).





















Linke, 763 N.E.2d 972
(Ind. 2002) (Sullivan,
J.).





N.E.2d 930 (Ind. 2004)
(Sullivan, J.).
Helsley v. State, 809
N.E.2d 292 (Ind. 2004)
(Dickson, J.).
Stroud v. State, 809
N.E.2d 274 (Ind. 2004)
(Sullivan, J.).
Baird v. State, 833
N.E.2d 28 (Ind. 2005)
(Shepard, C.J.).
Blanck v. Ind. Dep't of
Corr., 829 N.E.2d 505
(Ind. 2005) (Sullivan,
J.).
Lambert v. State, 825
N.E.2d 1261 (Ind.
2005) (Shepard, C.J.).
State v. Azania, 875
N.E.2d 701 (Ind. 2007)
(Sullivan, J.).
State v. McManus, 868
N.E.2d 778 (Ind. 2007)
(Shepard, C.J.).
ILLUSTRATING SWING VOTES I:
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
Drug testing of students in various settings did
not violate IN const'n. Dissent would not have
tested.
Death sentence, third review; alleged errors not
recognized, affirmed. Dissent would allow DNA
testing request.
Affirmed refusal to pierce the corporate veil
against employee salary claims. Concurrence
affirms recognizing murky facts.
Double murder conviction upheld, no errors.
Concurrences would give stronger procedural
protection to defendant, allowing the judge not to
follow a jury recommendation of death.
Affirms triple murder conviction, errors harmless,
vacates sentences on faulty jury instruction.
Concurrence states that trial court will have
latitude to override death recommendation if not
supported by the facts.
Second postconviction review of triple murder
conviction that had two appellate reviews, not
granted. Dissent finds accused obviously insane.
Denies prisoner's private right of action against
disciplinary measures. Concurrence agrees with
no private right of action and would dismiss for
failure to state a claim.
Leave for second postconviction relief petition
denied. Dissents would grant reconsideration
with strong doubts about the applicability of the
death penalty.
Third death penalty resentencing did not time-bar
death sentence. Dissent would allow life without
parole.
Denied death sentence reversal on retardation,
errors harmless. Dissent would affirm trial court's



















Norris v. State, 896
N.E.2d 1149 (Ind.
2008) (Dickson, J.).
Williams v. Tharp, 914
N.E.2d 756 (Ind. 2009)
(Dickson, J.).
Pendergrass v. State,
913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind.
2009) (Shepard, C.J.).
Bonner v. Daniels, 907
N.E.2d 516 (Ind. 2009)
(Dickson, J.).
Hardley v. State, 905
N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 2009)
(Dickson, J.).
McCullough v. State,
900 N.E.2d 745 (Ind.
2009) (Dickson, J.).
Whatley v. State, 928
N.E.2d 202 (Ind. 2010)
(Sullivan, J.).
Defendant could not challenge his guilty plea in
postconviction proceedings by a claim of newly
discovered evidence. Concurrence agrees but not
as a matter of law.
Witness statements to police have qualified
immunity from defamation. (cf. Holcomb)
Dissents find evidence of lies and would remand
for trial.
Affirms child molestation conviction, DNA
testimony errors were harmless. Dissent would
grant the right to cross-examine technician.
Indiana's public school finance scheme proper.
Truly a 4-1 case, Boehm concurs, only Rucker
dissents and finds the issue justiciable.
State allowed to appeal concurrent nature of theft
sentences. Dissent would preclude State's appeal
if not raised at trial.
State may seek heavier sentence if defendant
appeals. Concurrence would state practice of
never granting heavier penalties.
35-year sentence for over 3 grams of cocaine
possession appropriate. Dissent would not allow
aggravation for the church not mentioned in the
statute.
H. Boehm-Dickson-Sullivan (Five o'Clock Position)
The Boehm-Dickson-Sullivan majority did not author any opinions.
L Shepard-Boehm-Sullivan (Seven o'Clock Position)
McIntosh v. Melroe




Mangold v. Ind. Dep't
of Nat. Res., 756
N.E.2d 970 (Ind. 2001)
(Rucker, J.).
10-year limitation of products liability claim was
constitutional. Dissent sees it as unconstitutional
if the injured could not have known.
Tort; Conservative.
Negligence of 12-year-old student (who smashed Dropped.
gun shell at home) barred recovery against school

















Hollowell v. State, 753
N.E.2d 612 (Ind. 2001)
(Sullivan, J.).
Fleetwood Enters., Inc.
v. Progressive N. Ins.
Co., 749 N.E.2d 492
(Ind. 2001) (Boehm,
J.).
Progressive Ins. Co. v.
Gen. Motors Corp.,
749 N.E.2d 484 (Ind.
2001) (Boehm, J.).
Durham ex rel. Estate
of Wade v. U-Haul
Int'l, 745 N.E.2d 755
(Ind. 2001) (Boehm,
J.).
In re Allen, 783
N.E.2d 1118 (Ind.
2002) (per curiam).
Turley v. Hyten, 772
N.E.2d 993 (Ind. 2002)
(Sullivan, J.).
Ind. High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n v. Martin, 765
N.E.2d 1238 (Ind.
2002) (Sullivan, J.).
Love v. State, 761
N.E.2d 806 (Ind. 2002)
(Sullivan, J.).
Springer v. State, 798
N.E.2d 431 (Ind. 2003)
(Sullivan, J.).
ILLUSTRATING SWING VOTES I:
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
Drug conviction appeal; affirmed, searches
permissible, prior battery conviction relevant.
Dissent would allow jury right not to find
habitual offender aggravation.
Liability under Products Liability Act includes
harm to other products. Concurrence sees result
mandated by precedent.
Liability under Products Liability Act does not
accrue if damage only to the product.






Wrongful death statute interpretation; no punitive Tort; Conservative.
damages, loss of spousal consortium allowed.
Dissent would allow punitive damages.
Atty disciplinary imposition of 90-day
suspension proper. Dissent 1 finds it too lenient;
dissent 2 too strict.
Landlord keeps security deposit of destructive
tenant. Dissent points out that statute requires LL
to provide itemized damages w/in 45 days and
LL did not.
High school sports; appeal did not violate
injunction. Appellate court (reversed) would have
allowed athlete to play. Dissent sides with
appellate court.
Child molestation conviction upheld; errors
harmless. Dissent concurs but would not allow a
statement to reach the jury.
Affirmed recklessness conviction; need not
instruct jury of lesser negligence for defs taking
loaded cocked gun to avenge uninvited son's
expulsion from party. Dissent would require jury








Morgen v. Ford Motor
Co., 797 N.E.2d 1146
(Ind. 2003) (Sullivan,
J.).





791 N.E.2d 201 (Ind.
2003) (Shepard, C.J.).
Cheatham v. Pohle,







Ott, 785 N.E.2d 1068
(Ind. 2003) (Sullivan,
J.).
Black v. A.C. & S.,
Inc., 785 N.E.2d 1084
(Ind. 2003) (Sullivan,
J.).
Harris v. A.C. & S.,
Inc., 785 N.E.2d 1087
(Ind. 2003) (Sullivan,
J.)
Jurich v. Garlock, Inc.,
785 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind.
2003) (Sullivan, J.).




Products liability; passenger without seatbelt
loses against manufacturer. Dissents object to
considering not wearing seatbelts to support an
instruction of misuse of the product.
Beverage commission officer receiving tips was
chargeable. Dissent believes rule of lenity
required favoring defendant.
Hospital lien perfected against successor
attorney. Dissent finds statutory language meant
lien was not perfected w/r/to successor atty.
Statute giving state 75% of punitive damages is
not unconstitutional taking.
Statutory restrictions against asbestosis liability
upheld in favor of manufacturers. Dissent would
impose more liability.
Statutory restrictions against asbestosis liability
upheld in favor of manufacturers. Dissent would
impose more liability.
Statutory restrictions against asbestosis liability
upheld in favor of manufacturers. Dissent would
impose more liability.
Statutory restrictions against asbestosis liability
upheld in favor of manufacturers. Dissent would
impose more liability.
Statutory restrictions against asbestosis liability
upheld in favor of manufacturers. Dissent would
impose more liability.
Trade secret act interpretation, against liability.

















N.E.2d 699 (Ind. 2004)
(Shepard, C.J.).
Ind. Dep't of Envtl.
Mgmt. v. West, 838
N.E.2d 408 (Ind. 2005)
(Sullivan, J.).








R & D Transp., Inc. v.





Inc., 858 N.E.2d 103
(Ind. 2006) (Sullivan,
J.).
Trail v. Boys & Girls
Clubs of Nw. Ind., 845
N.E.2d 130 (Ind. 2006)
(Shepard, C.J.).
Overton v. Grillo, 896
N.E.2d 499 (Ind. 2008)
(Boehm, J.), reh'g
denied.
ILLUSTRATING SWING VOTES I:
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
Neighbors' attempt to close swine farm for env'i
violations defeated. Dissent finds merit in move
to disqualify judge.
State employment law, no age discrimination
liability. Dissent considers age discrimination
possible.
Upholds contractual time-barring of warranty
claims. Concurrence agrees. Dissent would
trigger limitations from discovery of defect
(despite clear language).
Vicarious asbestos liability; mostly against
liability. Dissent concurs to result but not to the
interpretation against possibility of liability.
Venue and transfer to where accident occurred;
slightly against tort plaintiffs. Dissent finds
change major and should occur through the
process of amending trial rules.
Gas station reports to police motorists who do not
pay who pursue defamation and false
imprisonment. For gas station. Dissent would not
grant summaryjgmt. (cf. Williams v. Tharp)
Defamation of executive director and tortious
interference. Correctly dismissed. Dissent would
remand.
Medical malpractice; limitations started upon
knowledge of disease (not upon advice about
malpractice liability by atty). Dissent thinks













Walden v. State, 895
N.E.2d 1182 (Ind.
2008) (Sullivan, J.).
Smith v. State, 889
N.E.2d 261 (Ind. 2008)
(Sullivan, J.).




State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. D.L.B., 881
N.E.2d 665 (Ind. 2008)
(Sullivan, J.).
Keesling v. Beegle,





N.E.2d 906 (Ind. 2009)
(Shepard, C.J.).
Ind. Dep't of Revenue
v. Kitchin Hosp., LLC,
907 N.E.2d 997 (Ind.
2009) (Sullivan, J.).
Stanley v. Walker, 906
N.E.2d 852 (Ind. 2009)
(Sullivan, J.).
Jackson v. Scheible,
902 N.E.2d 807 (Ind.
2009) (Boehm, J.).
Vehicular death conviction; jury instruction about
habitual offender did not need to instruct about
refusal to so find. Dissents would allow
instruction not to find so.
Four counts of child molestation, four
consecutive 30-year terms. Upheld. Dissent
agrees but would not have reconsidered
sentencing as that encroaches on trial court's
authority.
Non-reappointment of associate professor
justifies unemployment benefits. Dissent would
consider that the term of the pre-tenure contract
made the end voluntary, not entitling to
unemployment.
Witness could not claim emotional distress for
seeing the accident. Dissent would not grant
summary judgment although agrees emotional
distress is not covered, but that was not raised at
trial.
Corrupt practices liability possible to lower level
executives. Dissent thinks only those directing
the enterprise should be subject to RICO liability.
Hospital not liable for releasing to care of violent
person. Dissent would have trial because
potential liability for releasing to care of domestic
violence exists.
Tax; hotel's exemption argument denied. Dissent
would uphold specialist tax court.
Medical damages claims are actual (after
discounts). Dissent would not discount.
Seller of property with a tree that obstructed
killed bicyclist's view of oncoming traffic not
liable. Dissent would impose liability since seller















State v. Kimco of
Evansville, Inc., 902
N.E.2d 206 (Ind. 2009)
(Boehm, J.).
In re Lauter, 933
N.E.2d 1258 (Ind.
2010) (per curiam).




ILLUSTRATING SWING VOTES I:
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
Reconfiguration of roads through shopping center
was not a compensable taking. Dissent would
affirm lower cts that found taking.
Reversed lower court and imposed reprimand on
attorney. Dissent considered proof insufficient
and would not sanction.
Worker v mine; mostly against liability of mine.
Dissent would allow worker to recover under






J. Shepard-Rucker-Sullivan (Eight o'Clock Position)
Allen v. State, 720
N.E.2d 707 (Ind. 1999)
(Shepard, C.J.).
Oman v. State, 737
N.E.2d 1131 (Ind.
2000) (Sullivan, J.).
Ellis v. State, 736
N.E.2d 731 (Ind. 2000)
(Shepard, C.J.).
City of Gary v. Ind.
Bell Tel. Co., 732
N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 2000)
(Sullivan, J.), reh'g
denied.
Midwest Sec. Life Ins.
Co. v. Stroup, 730
N.E.2d 163 (Ind. 2000)
(Shepard, C.J.).
Francis v. State, 758
N.E.2d 528 (Ind. 2001)
(Rucker, J.).
Reduction of 165-year sentence to 115 for murder
was not unreasonable. Dissents would uphold on
finding jury instruction appropriate.
Firefighter; driving under the influence inferred
from mandated test. Admissible. Concurrence
would impose some confidentiality on tests.
Ordering resentencing of 165-year multiple
murder sentence. Dissent does not find
consecutive sentences an error.
Upholds city right to impose fee/tax on use of its
property by telco. Dissent disagrees for the period
before the passage of corresponding law.
ERISA preempts common law breach claims.
Concurrence would preserve jury trials that
appellate opinion precluded.
Murder conviction; errors were harmless but













Randolph v. State, 755
N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 2001)
(Rucker, J.).




Wallace v. State, 753
N.E.2d 568 (Ind. 2001)
(Rucker, J.).
Wadsworth v. State,
750 N.E.2d 774 (Ind.
2001) (Shepard, C.J.),
reh'g denied.
Holsinger v. State, 750
N.E.2d 354 (Ind. 2001)
(Sullivan, J.).
Pennycuff v. State,






Murder conviction; no self-defense, no mistrial
because court told the defense that it could
admonish the jury about lack of criminal record.
The dissent finds admonition refusal a waiver
only if admonition would have cured error.
Robbery and multiple side crimes; no errors.
Concurrence would grant greater procedural
protection of the right to object.
Child molestation prosecutions were time-barred.
Dissent finds limitations to be waivable, requiring
an objection.
Murder, burglary convictions proper. Dissent
might doubt the sufficiency of burglary evidence
(no opinion).
Double murder, robberies; convictions proper,
sentences should be concurrent. Dissent 1:
failure to request an admonishment does not
necessarily result in waiver; would uphold
consecutive nature of sentences. Dissent 2 agrees
errors were harmless but more important than
majority see them. Not considered 3-2 because
only one true dissent, and that is from sentencing,
dissents also have liberal nature in the CrimPro
issues, but again each on a different one.
Child molestation and sexual misconduct with
minor convictions proper; proper procedure for
no mitigation for cooperation and search proper.
Dissents would reverse.
Landowner's counterclaim against county for
falsely not granting license was properly barred.















Guyton v. State, 771
N.E.2d 1141 (Ind.
2002) (Shepard, C.J.).
State v. Adams, 762
N.E.2d 728 (Ind. 2002)
(Sullivan, J.), reh'g
denied, cert denied,
537 U.S. 1030 (2002).
Kennedy v. Guess Inc.,
806 N.E.2d 776 (Ind.
2004) (Shepard, C.J.),
reh'g denied.
Fackler v. Powell, 839
N.E.2d 165 (Ind. 2005)
(Sullivan, J.).
Clinic for Women, Inc.
v. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d
973 (Ind. 2005)
(Rucker, J.).
Cotto v. State, 829
N.E.2d 520 (Ind. 2005)
(Rucker, J.).
State v. Spillers, 847
N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 2006)
(Rucker, J.).
State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Estep, 873
N.E.2d 1021 (Ind.
2007) (Shepard, C.J.).
ILLUSTRATING SWING VOTES I:
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
Murder and side crimes; attempted murder
instruction ought to include specific intent to kill.
Concurrences stricter, to find double jeopardy for
lesser crime, the def must show "reasonable, not
speculative or remote," possibility that the jury
used the same evidentiary facts.
Improperly found cocaine can still be taxed.
Dissent sees the same justification of the
exclusionary rule operating here and would not
allow state to benefit by taxing for its violation.
Products liability for broken umbrella; mostly
reverses summary judgment in favor of
defendants. Concurrence would grant SJ to
licensor, Guess.
Enforcing mrtge assigned by dissolution;
dissolution court retains jurisdiction to interpret
decree. Dissent would assign dispute to the local
court.
Statute requiring 18hr abortion notice not
unconstitutional. Dissent 1 (framed as
"concurrence in result") would dismiss; dissent 2
would find right to liberty. Unorthodox as
dissents on either side of majority.
50-year sentence for meth possession shortened
to 30. Dissent would uphold trial court's
sentencing.
Motion to suppress drug evidence; officer's good
faith belief in warrant allowed it. Concurrence
would allow search without good faith, as a
statement against interest.
Auto accident; assigning claims to lawyers;
impermissible; insurance co may intervene.
Dissent: insurance co may not intervene and













Grant v. Hager, 868
N.E.2d 801 (Ind. 2007)
(Sullivan, J.).
Sweatt v. State, 887
N.E.2d 81 (Ind. 2008)
(Shepard, C.J.).
Auto-Owners Ins. Co.
v. Bank One, 879
N.E.2d 1086 (Ind.
2008) (Sullivan, J.).
Jensen v. State, 905
N.E.2d 384 (Ind. 2009)
(Rucker, J.).
Ind. Dep't of State
Revenue v. Belterra
Resort Ind., LLC, 935














929 N.E.2d 703 (Ind.
2010) (Sullivan, J.).
Appropriate for trial court to overcome
presumption and order custodial parent to pay
support to noncustodial. Dissent would uphold
court that followed guidelines.
Burglary enhanced; enhancement from two
counts of prior offense not impermissible,
consecutive sentences impermissible. Dissent
would allow consecutive sentences.
Insurance co claimed bank's acceptance of
fraudulent checks by employee of bank was
conversion; no liability of bank. Dissent agrees
but would allow trial.
Sex offender by plea bargain had to submit to
subsequent lifetime registration. Dissent 1 would
find claims not yet ripe for adjudication; dissent 2
would prevent additional registration obligation
as ex post facto punishment.
Acquisition of riverboat casino subject to sales
tax as retail transaction. Dissent sees it as a
capital contribution, not taxed.
Gambler defense of abuse of compulsive
gambling disease barred by statute. Dissent 1
concurs but would limit framework of liability
generally; dissent 2 would allow liability.
Unorthodox 3-2 as dissents on either side of
majority.
Multiple burglars who got 70 years after State
revoked 30-year plea, should have sentence
shortened. Dissent without opinion.
Dispute btwn county and probate court; approves
cost-cutting renovations, denies salary increases,
remands on land sale. Dissent concurs in all
except land sale, would affirm lower court which
vacated mandate not to sell w/out court's consent.
Other; Conservative.
Sent'g/PR/Crim'l;
Liberal.
Tort; Conservative.
Sent'g/PR/Crim'l;
Conservative.
Other; Liberal.
Dropped.
Sent'g/PR/Crim'l;
Liberal.
Other; Conservative.
134 [Vol. 53:95
